This, incidentally, is typical of Wells's way with his published texts; he kept on fiddling with them. In most cases the fiddlings are improvements; but not always. Sometimes there is no clear advantage either way, and one wonders why he bothered.

[Part 2 of David Lake's article, in Issue 12 of the Wellsian, will examine the texts of The Invisible Man and The First Men in the Moon.]

Notes

1 Also of composition. Letters of Wells preserved in the University of Illinois Library make it clear that the main draft of The War of the Worlds was written from late 1895 through mid 1896, followed immediately by The Invisible Man, June - August 1896. War began serial publication in April 1897, Invisible Man in June 1897.


4 It should be noted that the so-called "Critical Edition" of The Time Machine plus The War of the Worlds by Frank D. McConnell (New York: OUP, 1977) does not have critical texts: its copy-text for Time Machine seems to have been Dent 1935 (or Berkley 1957), and for War the partly corrupt Heinemann 1951. See the review by David Y. Hughes, Science Fiction Studies 4 (1977), 196 - 7.


6 A2 p 25, the captain says: "This ship ain't for beasts"; Hn, Essex, SR read "for beasts and cannibals"; A2 p 53, "I pushed on. Colour vanished ..."; Hn, Essex, SR, "The colour vanished ..."; A2 p 113, "his heavy white-fringed face was grim"; Hn, Essex, SR, "... face was grimly set."

7 For the serial versions of The War of the Worlds and The First Men in the Moon I use the photo-reprints in The Collector's Book of Science Fiction by H.G. Wells (Secaucus, New Jersey: Castle Books, 1978). For the serial of The Invisible Man I use photocopies of the original held in the British (Newspaper) Library.

8 Published in The Pall Mall Gazette (not Budget, as the Narrator says in IL2), 6 Nov 1893, and collected in Certain Personal Matters (1897), retitled 'Of a Book Unwritten'.

9 A3 has "Street Chobham" at pp 271, 282, and twice on p 327; Essex corrects these last two instances.

10 See the articles by Bergonzzi and Lake, note 2 above.

The Unholy Alliance of Science in The Island of Doctor Moreau

R.D. Haynes

Like Frankenstein, The Island of Doctor Moreau is, amongst other things, a comprehensive analysis of the prevailing assumptions of science and the presumption of scientists. Like Mary Shelley, Wells has suffered from his own success as a story writer so that most readers, struck by the sinister nature of Moreau and the horrors he has perpetrated, fail to see the full complexity of Wells's depiction and the various facets which make up the portrait. Moreover, there are two other scientists in this novel, the ineffectual drunkard Montgomery and the neglected narrator Prendick. Each of these amplifies or complements aspects of Moreau's character and thus contributes to the representation of the scientist which Wells was evolving at this stage of his writing.

While drawing on earlier stereotypes of the scientist, Wells recasts and develops them in peculiarly modern terms, thereby introducing into the ethical debate occasioned by Darwinian theory implications which had not previously been recognised but which had appeared obvious enough to the science student at South Kensington. To appreciate the full significance and complexity of his scientific group portrait and its sombre sociological implications therefore, it is necessary to look closely not only at Moreau but also at Montgomery and Prendick, the two hitherto neglected characters on this strange volcanic island and examine how all three of them modify or reinforce the composite image of the scientist.

Doctor Moreau himself is presented realistically enough at first as a dedicated, if eccentric, biologist. Exiled from Britain after a scandal erupting from experiments involving vivisection, he lives in almost complete isolation, unwilling to see or communicate with anyone other than his assistant, Montgomery. His physical appearance is impressively austere and his serenity, the touch almost of beauty that resulted from his set tranquillity, and from his magnificent build, are remarked upon by Prendick who, of all people, should have good reason to question the serenity and tranquillity of a man prepared to cast him away in a dinghy without provisions. Moreover, there is the evidence of a noble devotion to research and a contempt for ease and social rewards. Prendick, recalling the rumours about Moreau's past, reflects:
“He might perhaps have purchased his social peace by abandoning his investigations, but he apparently preferred the latter, as most men would who have once fallen under the overmastering spell of research.” (p. 49.)

Thus Moreau represents in heightened form some of the most attractive qualities associated with the scientist. Yet he also has a symbolic function which, while not obliterating the realistic aspect of his presentation, is crucial in extending the significance both of the story and of the character of Moreau qua scientist. In part this is achieved by implicit references to earlier literary stereotypes of the scientist, in particular to the tradiiton of the alchemist, to Frankenstein and, by extension, to the images of God the Creator in the Bible.

It is clear from the outset that Moreau embodies several stock characteristics of the alchemist. Thus he lives in such rigorous seclusion that he even intends to deny the shipwrecked Prendick access to his island (itself a physical symbol of his isolation), and his work is conducted in the strictest secrecy in a locked laboratory. He is not prepared to divulge to Prendick what he was working on until circumstances make the revelation imperative. These overtones of the sequestered alchemist immediately suggest that such secrecy may denote a preoccupation which is morally suspect.

The characterisation of Moreau also includes significant parallels with Frankenstein. Not only are their research programmes directed towards the same end - the creation of human beings - but their attitudes too are strikingly similar. Both are obsessed with their work, finding any interruption almost intolerable. “I’m itching to get to work again - with this new stuff” (p 44), says Moreau, aggrieved at the interruption caused by Prendick’s arrival, “And here I have wasted a day saving your life,” (p 105).

As Frankenstein, paradoxically, creates his living Monster from the materials of death, collecting bones and sinews from graves and charnel houses, so Moreau’s experiments too are associated with death - with the literal death of the ‘failures’ (Moreau himself, facetiously but accurately, calls his laboratory “a kind of Bluebeard’s Chamber in fact” p 45.) and with the baptismal bath of pain through which the animals must pass, as though through death, to be made ‘human’. This is further reflected in Moreau’s own name, a condensation of ‘water of death’, and in that more tangible water of death, blood, the most vivid and pervasive symbol of the novel and the one largely responsible for the distaste and rejection it immediately evoked on its publication.

Whether because of the nature of his research or because of his self-imposed isolation, Moreau, like Frankenstein, has cut himself off from the humanising influences of society. Those who do not approve of his methods are, to his mind, stupid. Indeed, the arrogance with which he treats Prendick on his arrival on the island is merely a reflection of the profound hubris implicit in his whole experiment. Traditionally the attempt to create life, and especially human life, has been seen as a usurpation of divine power. The myth of Prometheus plasticator is based on this premise and records the vengeance exacted by Zeus for such effrontery.

Wells’s use of the Prometheus myth, however, is more complex. He uses it not only to indicate the hubris of his scientist protagonist, but also to reflect upon the assumptions implicit in the attitudes of contemporary science. Just as William Blake realised that a concept of God based upon Newtonian physics could be only the Great Mathematician and therefore regarded Newton as the most dangerous advocate of the error of materialism, Wells represents in his protagonist just such a deity as might validly be postulated from Darwinism. Moreau embodies not the purposes of a loving god, but the incipient, mechanistic process which Darwin and Wallace had so unambiguously exposed. The almost arbitrary succession of beasts which passes through Moreau’s hands re-encapsulates the idea of the evolutionary process as nature’s giant experiment wherein much ‘material’ must, necessarily, be lost for the sake of a few ‘successes’. Moreau, who uses these same terms when describing his work, is as ruthlessly amoral as the contemporary view of nature; indeed his character is virtually a dramatisation of the dangers which Huxley had warned would result from an ‘imitation’ of the cosmic process or from the attempt to derive a social ethic from it.

“Cosmic evolution may teach us how the good and evil tendencies of man came about; but in itself it is incompetent to furnish any better reason why what we call good is preferable to what we call evil than what we had before ... Let us understand once and for all, that the ethical progress of society depends not on imitating the cosmic process, still less on running away from it, but in combating it.”

Moreau justifies his relentless pursuit of his work by just such an imitation of the cosmic process, by an appeal to a ‘natural’ philosophy:
"I am a religious man, Prendick, as every sane man must be. It may be, I fancy, I have seen more of the ways of this world's Maker than you - for I have sought His laws, in my way, all my life." (p 107)

The 'laws' to which Moreau refers are not those of a benevolent Wordsworthian Nature, but those which underlie the evolutionary process - chance, waste and pain. Indeed it is repeatedly insisted upon that Moreau's creations involve all these aspects. Wells thus uses Moreau in this role, as an allegory of the evolutionary process, to expose some of the problems which Darwinian theory raised, not only for religious orthodoxy but, equally, for humanist beliefs in the essential nobility and goodness of Man, problems which nineteenth-century science with its essentially optimistic philosophy had chosen to ignore. Conversely, the amoral course of evolution attaches in turn to Moreau the scientist who represents that process. He is depicted as having abandoned traditional ethical values and adopted instead a frame of reference that is at best amoral and more often remorseless.

"To this day I have never troubled about the ethics of the matter. The study of Nature makes a man at last as remorseless as Nature." (p 108)

It is no accidental irony that Moreau, who aspires to transcend human limitations, should uncover the innate bestiality of man nor that this island, which disposits once and for all of the romantic belief in the 'noble savage', is presumed to be Noble's Island. Further, although Moreau has been concerned with demonstrating this continuity in only one direction, by 'elevating' beasts to human form, he is forced to realise that the continuity is equally valid in the contrary direction: the 'human' beasts revert to their previous bestial state. Nor, the novel implies, is such reversion confined to the Beast People. We have had forewarning of this in the lifeboat of the Lady Vain, when the three castaways agree to draw lots for the sacrifice of one of their number. The impending cannibalism is prevented only by the falling overboard of two of the men. When Prendick is rescued by Montgomery, he is revived by 'a dose of some scarlet stuff, iced. It tasted like blood' (pp 13-14) and reacts with carnivorous enthusiasm to the boiled mutton offered him: "I was so excited by the appetising smell of it, that I forgot the noise of the beast forthwith." (p 16). We see the full significance of this later when Prendick hears the Beast People reciting the Law which is designed to keep them human: 'Not to eat Flesh nor Fish; that is the Law. Are we not Men?' (p 85). Moreover, as the end of the novel demonstrates, Prendick, at least, believes that this devolution is not confined to the Beast People. The respectable members of civilised British society seem to him to be reverting to the beast before his horrified gaze. Thus the whole novel involves an extended pun on the title of Darwin's controversial book, The Descent of Man and Moreau, the director of this microcosmic drama, embodies the characteristics of the cosmic process he presumes to surpass.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Moreau functions as an allegorical representation of the arrogance of science, regarding itself as exempt from the responsibilities imposed on the rest of society. Contemptuous of social condemnation, Moreau is still exploiting the use of pain with sadistic satisfaction:

"Each time I dip a living creature into the bath of pain, I say, "This time I will burn out all the animal, this time I will make a rational creature of my own."" (p 112)

When Prendick enquires about his justification for inflicting this degree of pain, Moreau waives any such consideration, adopting the impersonal frames of reference of geology and biology - cosmic dimensions of space and eons of time:

"[Pain] is such a little thing. A mind truly opened to what science has to teach must see that it [pain] is a little thing. It may be that, save in this little planet, this speck of cosmic dust, invisible long before the nearest star could be attained - it may be, I say, that nowhere else does this thing called pain occur. ... After all, what is ten years? Man has been a hundred thousand in the making." (pp 106, 113)

Such criteria are essentially objective and inhuman and here Wells dramatises his reservations about the scientific perspective, namely that, judged by it parameters, human feelings, sympathy and ethical values are irrelevant. This in turn raises, for Wells as for Mary Shelley, the question of the social responsibility of scientists, an issue which has become one of the preoccupations of twentieth-century literature of science and of philosophers of science. Moreau denies the relevance of any moral system in scientific research. His only motivating force is the course of the experiment itself presented as an abstract problem, devoid of any other considerations:

"I went on with this research just the way it led me. That is the only way I ever heard of research going. The thing
before you is no longer an animal, a fellow-creature, but a problem.” (p 107)

However, Moreau does not escape the irony, expressed in the form of paradox, which Wells used in several of his early and most successful works. Just as the Time Traveller, having invented a time machine in order to overcome the restrictions of time, finds himself still the prisoner of time and, in each case, a time more inimical than his own age, so Moreau, having worked to achieve mastery over evolution and the restrictions of human creativity, becomes the victim of that plasticity he has insisted upon, being killed by one of his creations, the Puma Woman, his latest attempt at ‘perfection’. More subtly, just as the Time Traveller finds that, the further he travels into the future, the more that future resembles the remote past, so, the more Moreau attempts to overcome the limitations of the human condition, the more he uncovers those limitations: the more he determines to humanise his beasts, the more he demonstrates the bestiality of man and his own inhumanity. Moreau, with his ‘intellectual passion’, abhors the intrusion of feelings:

‘cravings, instincts, desires that harm humanity, a strange hidden reservoir to burst suddenly and inundate the whole being of the creature with anger, hate, or fear.’ (p 112)

In his zeal to excise such emotions from his creatures, he has exorcised from himself all humane considerations, the feelings and sympathies which distinguish humanity.

Despite the dominance of Moreau, both on the island and in the novel, Wells’s composite image of the scientist also depends considerably on the two other scientists in the novel, Montgomery and the narrator Prendick.

Montogomery is judged by Prendick to be a fundamentally weak character, assisting Moreau even while disapproving of his experiments. He thus represents the non-dedicated scientist, caught in a situation which is morally repugnant but from which he feels unable to escape. Montgomery tells Prendick that he is effectively trapped on the island since, owning to some professional misconduct soon after he first began to practise medicine, he, like Moreau, has been forced to leave England. We see the depth of his sense of exile when he literally, as well as metaphorically, burns the two boats “to prevent [their] return to mankind”! Montgomery is also distinguished from Moreau and Prendick by his interest in the Beast People, apparently for their own sake. It is he who, taking over where Moreau’s surgery left off, has attempted to teach them to speak. Prendick contemptuously dismisses his “sneaking kindness for some of these metamorphosed brutes, a vicious sympathy with some of their ways”. (p 120). We should not miss the serious pangs involved in the words ‘kindness’ and ‘sympathy’ because, in Prendick’s view, Montgomery’s empathy with the Beast Folk stems from his own reversion, through drink, to their state. Unlike Moreau who sets himself above his animal ancestry, Montgomery acknowledges his kinship with the beast within. Symbolically, as he goes out to share his brandy with four of the Beast Folk, he seems to Prendick to become indistinguishable from them. Prendick comments:

“I saw him administer a dose of the raw brandy to M’ling, and saw the five figures melt into one vague patch. ... I felt that for Montgomery there was no help; that he was in truth half akin to these Beast Folk, unfitted for human kindred.” (pp 156, 157)

We should not, however, assume that Prendick’s view is Wells’s. Prendick, as I shall show presently, is not a mouthpiece for Wells but a character, as flawed and as open to authorial criticism as the other two scientists. When we remember that Montgomery has twice saved Prendick’s life, firstly by reviving him after his ordeal in the Lady Vain and secondly by prevailing upon Moreau to allow him to land on the island, we may well begin to question Prendick’s self-righteous judgments. Unlike the research biologists, Moreau and Prendick, Montgomery has been a doctor and he retains something of the compassion traditionally associated with his calling. If Montgomery appears to degenerate during the time Prendick is on the island, this is at least partly because Prendick’s own mode of assessment changes. With unconscious irony, Prendick remarks:

“My one idea was to get away from these horrible caricatures of my Maker’s image, back to the sweet and wholesome intercourse of men. My fellow-creatures, from whom I was thus separated, began to assume idyllic virtue and beauty in my memory. My first friendship with Montgomery did not increase. His long separation from humanity, his secret vice of drunkenness, his evident sympathy with the Beast People, tained him to me. Several times I let him go alone among them. I avoided intercourse with them in every possible way.” (p 140 my italics)
We remember, although Prendick seems conveniently to have forgotten, that neither he nor his two original companions in the lifeboat of the *Lady Vain* displayed 'idyllic virtue' nor were Prendick's relations with the drunken captain of the *Ipecacuana* an obvious example of 'sweet and wholesome intercourse'. What we see happening here is Prendick's desperate determination to make sense of his situation by dividing the human species into two rigidly separated sub-groups - the Beast People and his own 'fellow-creatures'. The latter category must be as different as possible from the Beast People for clearly the thing Prendick least wants to recognise is any similarity between himself and the animal nature so apparent in the Beast People. Therefore, his absent 'fellow-creatures' are conveniently idealised in his memory and Montgomery who, by his attitudes and behaviour suggests painful parallels between the two groups, is firmly relegated to the non-human group. Hence Prendick's remarks, on examination, actually tell us less about Montgomery, their overt subject, than about Prendick himself, who must justify his philosophy by denigrating the only person on the island still capable of expressing the human emotion of compassion.

It is one of the more sombre considerations of the novel that, in attempting to retain his human feelings while accommodating to the scientific values of Moreau, Montgomery has virtually become insane. Like his increasing bouts of drunkenness, his last words express his inability to cope with his situation: "The last of this silly universe. What a mess." (p 162); but they comment equally well on the Darwinian picture of a universe governed by chance and accident. In this, Montgomery reflects the response of many nineteenth-century minds to Darwinism. In their diverse ways, Tennyson, Arnold, Clough and Hardy made, at some stage, the same comment.

The third scientist, Prendick, is an important and subtly drawn study to which virtually no attention has been paid. Bergonzi believes that Moreau 'is contrasted with the orthodox and humane scientist, Prendick, the former pupil of Huxley', and this is an obvious assumption to make, both because, for much of the novel, Prendick expostulates with his host and because we know that Wells retained a great admiration for his former Professor of Biology. However, a closer reading of the novel, especially the last chapter, would suggest a very different estimate of Prendick, one which shows even more clearly how extensive was Wells's casually acknowledged debt to Swift.

Prendick's attitudes change considerably during his stay on the island. At first, after overcoming his initial fear and disgust of the Beast Folk, he pities them:

"Poor brutes! I began to see the viler aspect of Moreau's cruelty. I had not thought before of the pain and trouble that came to these poor victims after they had passed from Moreau's hands ... Before they had been beasts, their instincts fitly adapted to their surroundings, and happy as living things may be. Now they stumbled in the shackles of humanity, lived in a fear that never died, fretted by a law they could not understand." (p 138)

Gradually though, Prendick becomes infected with Moreau's values and, despite his initial revulsion at the forms of the Beast People, he, like Moreau, begins to think of them as human.

"Insensibly I became a little habituated to the idea of them. ... I would see one of the clumsy bovine creatures who worked the launch treading heavily through the undergrowth, and find myself asking, trying hard to recall, how he differed from some really human yokel trudging home from his mechanical labours; or I would meet the Fox-Bear Woman's vulpine, shifty face, strangely human in its speculative cunning, and even imagine I had met it before in some city by-way." (pp 119, 121)

Ironically he, a biologist, becomes entangled in a dilemma involving biological classification. If the Beast People (to whom, if he is not to follow Montgomery, he must consider himself superior) begin to appear human, then Prendick himself must perform become superhuman. After Moreau's death he takes over Moreau's role on the island, wielding the whip and using force, both physical and moral, to keep the Beast People under control. He too assumes a god-like status; he speaks to the Dog Man in phrases which echo Christ's injunctions to Peter:

"After certain days and certain things have come to pass ... Every one of them save those you spare, every one of them shall be slain. ... And that their sins may grow ... let them live in their folly until their time is ripe." (pp 173, 174)

and he is gratified when the Dog Man addresses him as 'Master' and the Grey Thing as 'Man who walked in the Sea' (p 150).
On his return to England, Prendick finds the distinctions blurred from the other end of the beast-human spectrum. On the island he had experienced

“a strange... persuasion that, save for the grossness of the line, the grotesqueness of the forms, I had before me the whole balance of life in miniature, the whole interplay of instinct, reason, and fate, in its simplest form.” (p 138)

He now finds this ‘civilised’ island strongly reminiscent of Moreau’s island.

“I could not persuade myself that the men and women I met were not also another, still passably human, Beast People, animals half-wrought into the outward image of human souls, and that they would presently begin to revert, to show first this bestial mark and then that... I feel as though the animal was surging up through them; that presently the degradation of the Islanders will be played over again on a larger scale.” (pp 189, 190)

Thus Prendick, to make his own position tolerable, must continue to preserve a clear distinction between himself and these People-Beasts by assuming, at least in his own mind, a superiority which permits no confusion in status.

The parallel with Gulliver on his return to England from the land of the Houyhnhnms is obvious, but the interpretation which we are intended to derive from the parallel has been less clearly understood, partly because of the confusion about Swift's intentions at the end of Gulliver’s Travels. It has frequently been assumed that Swift feels the same revulsion for his fellow-men as does Gulliver; that Swift also identifies with the Houyhnhnms, as representing the ideal, and shrinks from English society as from the disgusting Yahoos. However there are very clear indications that we should not confuse Swift with Gulliver, that Gulliver, with his pretensions to be above the rest of humanity, to live on a higher plain of pure reason remote from physical considerations, is also an object of Swift’s satire. Gulliver writes,

“I began last week to permit my wife to sit at dinner with me, at the farthest end of a long table; and to answer (but with the utmost brevity) the few questions I asked her. Yet the smell of a Yahoo continuing very offensive, I always keep my nose well stopped with rue, lavender, or tobacco-leaves.”

Much the same holds true of Prendick. Disgusted by the 'mark of the beast' upon his society, he isolates himself as securely in England as Moreau on his island.

“When I lived in London the horror was well nigh insupportable. I could not get away from men; their voices came through the windows; locked doors were flimsy safeguards... I have withdrawn myself from the confusion of cities and multitudes, and spend my days surrounded by wise books, bright windows, in this life of ours lit by the shining souls of men.” (pp 190, 191)

This much might be taken as the aftermath of Prendick’s horrific experiences, an individual and perhaps credible reaction. But we need to notice the occupations which Prendick finds consoling in his situation. It is not accidental that they are all scientific pursuits, involving the same vast scales of time and space which Moreau had appealed to and which, in his view, justified, even rendered imperative, his lack of sympathy with the human condition, with human suffering.

“My days I devote to reading and to experiments in chemistry, and I spend many of the clear nights in the study of astronomy. There is, though I do not know how there is or why there is, a sense of infinite peace and protection in the glittering hosts of heaven. There it must be, I think, in the vast eternal laws of matter, and not in the daily cares and sins and troubles of men, that whatever is more than animal within us must find its solace and its hope... in hope and solitude, my story ends.” (pp 191 - 2)

Thus Prendick comes, finally, to represent a more subtle and hence, ultimately, a more insidious Moreau, maintaining a regimen which might, on the surface, be considered entirely respectable and appropriate to a scientist. It is noticeable that none of his experiments is seen to have any relevance to society, for he asserts that the isolated pursuit of pure science (the more abstract the better), is intrinsically superior to 'the daily cares and sins and troubles of men'. But we should not assume that Wells thinks so; the parallels with both Moreau and Gulliver are too insistent.
Thus Wells’s composite picture of scientists at this stage of his writing is far from flattering. He depicts them as either arrogant or helpless, crassly asserting the supremacy of abstract rationalism or failing in the attempt to combine humane values with experimental science. Thus The Island of Doctor Moreau contains not only the element of ‘theological grotesque’ which Wells pointed out, but equally (and perhaps, for our generation, more pertinently) a trenchant satire on the cult of research for its own sake, on the exclusiveness and isolationism of science with its contempt for the layman and ultimately for humanity. By showing the inability of Montgomery to counter the influence of Moreau and by portraying the same fundamental attitude in both the eccentric Moreau and the apparently ordinary, decent Prendick, Wells extends his implied criticism of science to include even the respectable gentleman scientist who has ‘taken to natural history as a relief from the dullness of my comfortable independence’ (p 15) and who has ‘done some research in biology under Huxley.’ (pp 41 - 2)

Notes

1 For Wells’s ambivalent response to his professors at the Normal School of Science, South Kensington, see H.G. Wells, Experiment in Autobiography (London: Jonathan Cape, 1969), chap 5, pp 210 - 222.
2 H.G. Wells, The Island of Doctor Moreau, (Harmondsworth; Penguin, 1967) p 114. All further quotations from the novel are from this edition.
3 This is emphasised, if emphasis were necessary, when Prendick hears Montgomery calling out the name as a disyllable - ‘Mor - eau’.
8 H.G. Wells, ‘Huxley’, Royal College of Science Magazine XIII (Apr. 1901) 211. cf. Experiment in Autobiography Chap 5, i, pp 201, 204.