3. MARKET AND TRANSPORT INSTITUTIONS IN NIGERIA’S LIVESTOCK TRADE: CASE STUDIES FROM SOKOTO AND IBADAN

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Introduction
Animal protein is an important dietary component for Nigeria’s middle and elite classes but its cost limits its accessibility by the poor. The relevance of livestock trade for the poor in Nigeria is less in the area of consumption but rather in employment generation and the inter-ethnic relations that it fosters. Traditional forms of production and marketing dominate Nigerian livestock commodity and operate at two levels. At one level are millions of individual and household producers who own a few sheep, goats and poultry and supply the market to supplement their income. At the second level are cattle holders (mostly Fulani), who owned large herds of cattle for supply into the market. The trading and marketing side of the livestock is dominated by the Hausas both at local and national levels.

Livestock breeding to the majority of the poor and the vulnerable in the North is a form of banking. Simmons (1976: 10) writes thus, “small livestock production, a source of income for many women, is considered to be good “banking” procedure rather than an occupation. Sheep, chickens and goats serve as stores of value in a bankless rural society, bearing interest in the form of offspring and remaining available for liquidation when cash is required”. A vast number of very poor people (of many different ethnic groups across Nigeria) obtain their livelihood through their participation in livestock-related activities such as small ruminant animal production, herding, animal and meat transport and porterage.

This study focuses principally on cattle, mostly produced in the North and mostly consumed in the South (Frike 1993; Inuwa 1989; Olayemi 1974; FDLPCS 1992; Mamman, 2004; Muazu 2005). Thus, while the North is dependent on the South for livestock markets, the south is equally dependent on the North for the supply. The inter-dependency that cuts across different ethnic groups that the livestock trade builds is therefore relevant in a country like Nigeria that experiences many cases of inter-ethnic conflict. Livestock production and trade is arguably a means through which Nigeria can build trust among different ethnic groups thereby fostering inter-ethnic understanding and unity (despite the fact that inter-ethnic herder-indigene tensions are widely reported).

This report brings together two case studies (Adamu, Mamman) focused on the Sokoto region, which is a major supplier of livestock for the country’s meat protein and leather needs, and one (Filani) focused on Ibadan, one of the
major southern cattle markets and centres of meat consumption. Trader networks, security, transport institutions and insurance and are key themes linking these studies. The goal of the report is to explore the major marketing and transport institutions which regulate the livestock trade and to identify areas where the potential for poor people to benefit from the trade could be improved.

Study locations
Two studies focus on Acida’s weekly livestock market in the north-west rearing region (one also examining Kara peri-urban market), one on Bodija market in the south-west consuming region: this allows us to follow the livestock chain from the collecting markets through to city butchers in Ibadan. Acida livestock market in Sokoto is the biggest livestock destination for neighbouring Niger Republic and villages/towns from Sokoto, Zamfara and Kebbi States as well as livestock outlets in the region, supplying livestock to neighbouring markets as well as to other livestock markets across the country (Sokoto state is second only to Bornu in livestock production). Bodija market, located in the Ibadan North Local Government area of Oyo State is the main recipient and distributor of cattle moved from different parts of northern states to Ibadan metropolis and parts of the Yoruba south west. Although Bodija remains the main cattle market in Ibadan, the main Kraal for initially receiving cattle from the northern states was moved to Akinyele about 19 kilometers north on the Ibadan – Oyo road after the 1999 Bodija ethnic conflict.

Methods
The methodology used for these studies is largely qualitative. Qualitative method enables us to understand the actors and the nature of their interactions in the markets and the processes and dynamics of the markets. The approach was familiar to all three researchers, given their background in sociology and geography.

Most informants were selected purposively. People of different social backgrounds such as those occupying leadership positions, and those who do not, were purposively sought out and interviewed. Other relevant characteristics such as ethnicity and gender were considered in the sampling. Snowballing technique was also used: for example, the sarkin Pawa in Acida market was first identified for interview and permission and he later introduced the researcher to other officials.

A range of data collection methods was used: lurking (this proved useful in modifying the list of actors drawn), unstructured interviews using checklists, telephone interviews (with transport merchants as they were mostly in Kebbi State), group interviews, direct observation and secondary materials from the market (such as notices and published materials on market operations) and elsewhere.

Social research has a social world of its own where the environment of the research, the researched and the researcher have impact on the quality and quantity of information collected. For example, the socio-economic position of the researcher such as ethnicity, religion, gender, class can be a hindrance or a facilitator in a research setting. In Adamu’s case the researcher’s status as a
woman was anticipated to be a hindrance, so her husband’s contacts in the market were capitalised. He made contacts and other underground work as well as linked up the researcher with one of the actors in the market. Feeling that the gender of the researcher may inhibit them from talking freely, a male research assistance always opened the discussion and intervened when the researcher wants to add a question or probe an issue. However, other factors work to the researchers’ favour such as coming from the area and therefore familiar with the phrases used in the discussion as well as the social relationships of the area. For example, the researcher exploited the system of joking relationships in Hausa society to get informants to relax. For instance, the researcher claimed to be a blacksmith because of the joking relationship that exists between the Blacksmith and Butchers and also that the researcher’s husband is Fulani, to allow for the establishment of informal and jovial environment during the interview with the Fulani. In the case of the Bodija study, arrangements for the different groups were made through Mr. Wasiu who is a main meat seller at Sango market in Ibadan. He was introduced by the researcher’s wife, his major customer.

The commodity chain

Figure 1: Livestock Trading Chain (based round Acida Kara Market)

Many actors and processes are involved in the livestock trade. The first stage in the North is carried out by small traders who moved among the cattle rearers.
who have between 5 – 10 herds of cattle. *Dillali* (selling commission agents) and *yan kwamisho* (transport commission agents) build up herds for transportation to the south of Nigeria. At the market retailers operate through a host of intermediary traders who seek carcass butchers in the urban and peri-urban areas to petty traders who take the cattle into more remote similar rural areas. There the butchers and meat buyers form the last link in the chain. They either operate direct from their own retail outlets or through subagents who carry meat as itinerant meat sellers in the urban areas.

Central to the livestock commodity chain in Hausa society is the *Kara* (Hausa for livestock market). Sources of livestock in Acida *kara* are breeders from villages and towns of Niger republic, Sokoto, Zamfara and Kebbi states. Once in the market, the sale is done by a *Dillali* (*dillalai*- plural, *dillanci* the system or practice) for a commissioned fee. The sale could be done either direct to a consumer, to a whole seller, to a butcher or to a long distance trader. At whatever stage, we have the drovers (*Yan’kora*), who transport the livestock by foot to the abattoir, to the resident of a buyer or to the long distance trade section of the market for loading to other markets.

**Table 1- Actors in Acida Kara Market**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>Local Terms</th>
<th>Roles</th>
<th>Men &amp; women, Hausa &amp; Fulani</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Breeders</td>
<td>Ma kiyaya</td>
<td>Producers of livestock</td>
<td>Men &amp; women, Hausa &amp; Fulani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brokers</td>
<td>Dillalai</td>
<td>Connecting sellers and buyers- selling to buyers at a % commission</td>
<td>Men, Hausa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport Commissioned agents. Also act as NURTW</td>
<td>Yan’kwamishon</td>
<td>Linking long distance traders with drivers. Mostly retired drivers.</td>
<td>Men, Hausa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long distance traders</td>
<td>Falake</td>
<td>Transport to sell livestock at a long distance market</td>
<td>Men, Hausa, Fulani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whole sellers</td>
<td>Yan Kasuwa</td>
<td>Buy and sell in bulk</td>
<td>Men, multiple ethnic groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retailers</td>
<td>Masu Saye da Sayarwa</td>
<td>Buy and Sell in smaller quantity</td>
<td>Men, Hausa, few Yoruba and Igbo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drovers</td>
<td>Yan’kora</td>
<td>They are transporters of livestock by foot for loading within the market or to various destinations out of the market.</td>
<td>Young Men, Fulani and Hausa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loaders</td>
<td>Yan,lodi</td>
<td>They load and off-load the animals into a trailer</td>
<td>Men, Hausa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardsmen</td>
<td>Yan’gadi</td>
<td>Those who spend the night in the market to guard the cattle pending the time of transportation.</td>
<td>Men, Hausa, Fulani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actors</td>
<td>Local Terms</td>
<td>Roles</td>
<td>Men, Fulani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miyyati Allah</td>
<td>Kungiyani Fulani</td>
<td>A Fulani socio-economic organisation that facilitate interactions</td>
<td>Men, Fulani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>between the Fulanis and other ethnic groups and actors in the market</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Butcher chief</td>
<td>Sarkin Pawa</td>
<td>Responsible for the Abattoir, meat sections of the market and the</td>
<td>Man, Hausa,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>activities of the butchers and facilitates interaction between</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>butchers and meat consumers relationships. He is the overall chief</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>in the market and therefore manages the affairs of the market in</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>consultation with other authorities in the market</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumers</td>
<td>Masu saye</td>
<td>Buy and consumers of meat</td>
<td>Men and women of all tribes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fulani Chief</td>
<td>Ardo (in Fulbe)</td>
<td>The chief of fulanis in Acida town and doubled in the market as</td>
<td>Men, Fulani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>who is also the</td>
<td>Chairman of the Kara market</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Butcher</td>
<td>Ma hauchi</td>
<td>Who slaughters and sells meat in the market</td>
<td>Men, Hausa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vigilante</td>
<td>Yan'banga</td>
<td>Provide security in the market</td>
<td>Men, Hausa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veterinary/health</td>
<td>Malamin dabbobi</td>
<td>A veterinarian officer who supervise the health of animals and the</td>
<td>Man, Hausa/Fulani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>officer</td>
<td></td>
<td>safety of the meat in the market</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>Yan'sanda</td>
<td>Provide security in the market</td>
<td>Men of all tribes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food sellers</td>
<td>Masu Abinci</td>
<td>Sell cooked food and snacks prepared from the home and hawked by</td>
<td>The girls are generally Hausas, snack and meal cooked in the market are</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>the girls or prepared in the market by both men and women.</td>
<td>made mostly by Hausa and Yoruba women and men.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The buyers range from housebound breeders, merchants, butchers, and individuals for family consumption and for food businesses. For each livestock sold, the *dillali* gets a fee. A *dillali* can transact in tens of livestock in every market, an average of 20 animals per market day was often quoted.

In southern Nigeria the sale of cattle at Akinyele Kraal is done by the Hausa dealers (*dillalai*). The *dillalai* are under the control of the landlords to whom they report on transactions with buyers. There are some middlemen called ‘*barandas*’ locally. These are people who stay around the Kraal waiting to work on new buyers who are not accustomed to the cattle business practice. They link the new buyer with the *dillalai* and often do the bargaining on behalf of the buyer. After any successful bargain, the buyer then pays the middlemen fees, ranging from N500.00 to N1,000.00. This is in addition to the N1,000.00 paid as ‘*la’ada*’ to the *dillalai*. In other words, it is more costly to buy through a middleman. A cow may change hands up to between five and seven times between the source in the northern markets to the slaughter slab at Bodija market. Good relationships develop over time among the various actors based on mutual trust.

While at Akinyele only live cattle are sold, at the Bodija market cows are sold either live or slaughtered. The majority of the dealers are retailers who buy different parts of the slaughtered cows for transportation to other markets in Ibadan metropolis.

**Formal and informal market institutions in the livestock trade**

Livestock trading in Nigeria operates principally within the informal sector. The *informal institutions* are the ones generally available within the market and are more likely to be utilised by the poor because of their simplicity, familiarity, and cost less. They are the main sources of market and trading information, provide credit and market security, enforce trade agreement and resolve conflict. Some of the positions in the northern markets are hereditary. In Acida these are appointed by the Sarkin Acida (village head of Acida) such as Sarkin Pawa. The Chairman of the market, leadership of transporters, commissioned agents (*dillalai*) are elected by members and endorsed by the Sarkin Pawa. According to the Sarkin Pawa, membership to the market associations is open to everybody through registration and payment of dues.

All the *dillalai* in Acida kara are male because of the commodity (livestock) involved. To become a *dillali* in Acida market, one has to pass through the Sarkin Pawa for allocation of space in the market. The requirement to become a *dillali* includes the origin of the person, that is whether he or his family is well known and respected, the character of the person and the person has to be of relative means. A *dillali* plays a central role in Acida Kara market.

Related to the system of *dillanci* is the practice of *la’ada*. *La’ada* is the commissioned fee paid to the *dillali* or any person that may have witnessed and contributed in the trading negotiations. In the past, at the final selling of a good, the decision may be taken whether it is going to be paid by the owner and therefore *la’ada ciki* (fee payment within the selling price) or by the buyer and
therefore *la,ada waje* (fee payment out of selling price). However, with the expansion of Shariah to cover commercial and criminal law in the North, the requirement to pay laada is discouraged in Acida market according to the Sarkin Pawa. The decision to pay and the amount to pay to people or person who witnesses a transaction is left at the discretion of the livestock owner.

Central to the *dillanci* system and the entire trading practice is the issue of trust which is built, in the case of *dillanci*, on the basis of religion, language and family background. The trading exists without any formal or written agreement between the *dillali* and the livestock owner. The livestock owner must have trust on the *dillali* he met for the first time to hand him over his livestock for sale and to expect the *dillali* to pay him the correct selling price. Similarly, the *dillali* must have trust on the livestock owner not to hand him stolen livestock for sale. The effectiveness of the trust lies in the permanency and reliability of the *dillanci* and other commissioned systems. It is the responsibility of the market traditional authorities to ensure that such trust is not violated. For instance, many cases of the *dillali* paying money to the wrong owner is reported by our informants and the traditional market conventions and authorities require the *dillali* to pay the livestock owner and bears the cost of the duping. The role of *dillali* in mitigating transaction risks and costs is central in a market that is temporary, transitory and most of its customers are from distance areas. Cases of selling of stolen livestock are reported in the market. The *dillali* and the *Dan kwamishon* provide some elements of permanency and reliability in the market where people from far distance places come and go with their goods. Faulty good bought can be returned to the *dillali* who is a permanent figure in the market.

Another important practice is the norm of reciprocity which acts as an insurance policy for the livestock traders. There existed a practice of helping one another in a period of crisis or calamity. A *dillali* who was duped was assisted by his fellow colleagues to raise money to pay the livestock owner so also a *falke* (long distance trader) who lost his whole capital to armed robbers. Related reciprocal norms existed in terms of taking over a customer from a fellow *dillali* or trader. In fact it is an offence in the market to draw a customer from a fellow trader and it is socially and economically costly for a trader to violate such reciprocal rules and conventions. He can be fined ostracized and even expelled from the market by Sarkin Pawa if he is found to maintain such habit. So these kinds of norms and conventions seem to manage competition between traders and therefore, ensure a healthy environment for trading in the market.

An important reciprocal relationship that exists is over shelter. A *dillali* is able to hold onto his customers of long distance livestock traders through provision of free shelter to them. A livestock trader transporting livestock to a far away and foreign distance, would require an accommodation, market information, food, water and other logistics to effectively function. Such services are provided by a trader’s *dillali*. If the trader incurs some lost, or the market is saturated and therefore, the trader is not able to sell, the *dillali* can assist the trader with some part payment to enable the trader to go back home and return later after the animals have been sold by the *dillali*. After the animals are sold, the trader pays the *dillali* his fee according to the quality of services he receives. This system of
shelter provision operates in all the livestock market centres of the North and South.

The market is not a free and equal environment, social stratification on the basis of patronage exists and both the patron and the clients are expected to conduct their activities within an acceptable practice, both in northern and southern case study markets. For one to become an established dillali in Acida market, he must work and operate under a more established dillali. The apprentice gets his skills, garnered his customers and builds his reputation as a trust worthy trader through relating with his patron. Most of the dillalai, Falake (long distance traders), transporters, butchers and so on have their own boys who assist them to conduct their businesses and in the process learn the tricks of livestock trading and build their networks. A master may have as high as 7 boys under him and do also assist their boys with credit and capital to start business. Obedience to establish traditional authority is an important norm that facilitates trading in the market. Every actor in the market is expected to obey the authority of the person above. The market customers are expected to accept the authority and arbitration of the Sarkin Kasuwa, similar expectations exist between a patron and his boy. Where the boy errs, it is the responsibility of the traditional authority to call the boy to order, discipline him and call the police if it is necessary. Phrases such as ‘my boys’ ‘our boys’, ‘this boy’s etc were used by many of Acida informants to describe their senior position in relation to their boys who are themselves traders in their own right.

The National Butcher’s Association regulates the activities of cattle dealers at the Bodija market. It sets and enforces rules for the dealers and performs a mediating role in the settlement of petty quarrels among dealers. For example, it determines how many cows can be slaughtered by a dealer in a day and any dealer that violates this allocation pays a fine of ₦5,000.00. The allocation to dealers is based on the number of cows they bring each day and the total number to be slaughtered in the abattoir on each day. If any dealer violates the rule regularly or is generally recalcitrant, he could be suspended for a period of 6 months. Also, entry into the cattle business in Bodija can only be through the Associations. A new member is usually introduced by an old member and a registration fee is paid. However, those who just buy parts of slaughtered cows to sell do not need any entry permit. (Almost all the cattle dealers in Bodija market are Yorubas. The few Hausa who buy parts of slaughtered cows are those who use these to make smoked meat.

Formal institutions in the livestock markets include the veterinary officer, police, village leaders and Local Government Authorities. The latter visits the markets, in most cases to collect revenue only (revenue at the gate, dues from the members of the various institutions in the market such as dillalai and yan’kwamishon). The Local Government may also provide fencing (Kara market), allocates space to traders (at a cost of N50.0 per month in Sokoto) and may settle disputes in conjunction with Miyyati Allah (a kind of Fulani cultural and economic association) or Livestock Traders Association. In general, respondents said they are constrained by the state institutions and parastatals in the operation of their businesses and that the overlapping
institutional rates roles and arrangement have made the situation worse for them.

A similar situation regarding local government charging exists in Ibadan. Certain charges are paid in the movement of cattle from the open space (former kraal) at Bodija to the abattoir. On every cow that is moved either by rope or by carts, the owner pays ₦100 to the Local Government and for every cow slaughtered the payment is ₦50.00 to the Local Government. In other words, for every cow moved to and slaughtered in the abattoir, the Local Government collects a revenue of ₦150.00. Although part of this revenue is expected to be used for environmental sanitation, there is no discerning evidence of such in and around the abattoir: conditions are deplorable.

**Semi formal institutions** are trade based organisations that are established and registered by the government to provide support to and protect the interests of its members. Such institutions include Miyyati Allah, an association of cattle rearers, and Road Transport Workers. Miyyati Allah is an association of cattle breeders mostly dominated by the Fulani. Membership of the association is opened to all ethnic groups according to its chairman. The Association functions in all major cities of Nigeria where livestock passes through or where trading in livestock exists. Leadership of the Association is elected and they perform several functions such as mediating between the livestock breeders and other stakeholders involve in livestock trade, providing security in livestock markets. In Acida Kara for example, the Association charges N20 for every cattle sold in the market.

There is some cooperation between formal and informal institutions, as between the Local Government Authority and the Traditional Authority (box 1).

**Box 1: Example of Co-operation among Institutions in Acida market**

The Chairman of the Miyyati Allah group in the market provided us with an example of the nature of the co-operation that exist among the market institutions. According to him, “there was a time when the market was congested with cattle, sheep and goats crammed in one place- as a result security and hygiene was difficult to maintain and crowd difficult to manage and control. The space was insufficient- so we called on to the Sarkin Pawa for the re-organisation of the market. He agreed and took the issue to His Royal Highness Dan Maliki and his highness took the issue to the Local Government Authority. The Authority then separated Cattle and smaller animals. That is why sheep and goats are now situated out of this area and this area is expanded. We now have enough

Some of the market institutions appear to be in transition in northern Nigeria. Those that are able to organise themselves may be transformed from traditional institutions into formal ones, but still retaining the traditional function of the institutions, hence referred here as semi-formal. The transformation is
necessary because of changes in scope of their activities (covering more then northern part of the country) and their source of legitimacy (beyond power of the Hausa traditional authority). Such institutions as Miyyati Allah and Road Transport workers performing the functions of Ardo and Dan-kwamishon but in a different name and operating in a different format. Such positions have been formalised with elections and written rules and regulations governing the conduct of their activities. However, the Associations of long distance traders (Fatake) are in the process of such transition and have been trying to get its association registered as a union for over ten years, but they are not successful. So, they have to continue operating within the traditional structure which is limited to local environment and which make it difficult for them to lobby and take action nationally.

**Table 2 Market Institutions in Acida Kara Market**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Formal</th>
<th>Semi-formal</th>
<th>Informal</th>
<th>Norms/practices</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-Local Government</td>
<td>-Miyyati Allah</td>
<td>-Traditional Authorities</td>
<td>-Trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Police</td>
<td>-Road Workers</td>
<td>-Long distance traders</td>
<td>-Dillani (brokerage)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Ministry of Agriculture</td>
<td>-Union</td>
<td>-Dillanci</td>
<td>-System of La’ada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Commissioned agency</td>
<td>-System of Reciprocity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Vigilante</td>
<td>-System of Patronage/clientele</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-System of Heritage ship</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Control of market space**

Market space in controlled substantially both in the northern and southern case study livestock markets by commission agents and others. Allocated space in Acida market was alleged to have connection with the power that be particularly the ruling political party in the state. According to almost all the informants, it is difficult, close to impossible to sell livestock in the Acida market premises without using the *dillali*. All the spaces in the market are allocated to the *dillalai*. A livestock owner cannot have space within the market to transact trade with a buyer directly and selling outside the market is illegal. This therefore leaves the livestock owner little choice but to utilize the *dillali*. When the *Sarkin pawa* was asked about the possibility of selling livestock without using the *dillali* he responded:

“No, whoever wants to sell livestock within the market premises will have to do it through a *dillali*. It is a law. Every selling or buying without *dillali* is illegal and therefore not acceptable”.

The space in the Akinyele Kraal (which can accommodate over 1000 heads of cattle) is allocated by the Akinyele Local Government to the various Associations present in Akinyele Kraal (table 1). There are about 20 landlords who control the space allocations in the various associations. These landlords are the main recipients and custodians of the cattle from the north. Each landlord is allocated space and he, in turn, allocates the spaces to individual
members of the various associations. Sometimes such allocations to individuals are made on the basis of group affinity. This group affinity could derive from people who come from the same towns or those who serve as apprentices under the landlords. Consequently new entrants could easily locate their cattle in spaces belonging to individuals on friendship and affinity basis. Some of the landlords also provide free accommodation for those traders who bring cattle to them.

**Market and price information**

The choice of the market by cattle dealers depends on information they receive about prices at various markets before embarking on their journeys, easy availability of transport and the varieties of cattle species in demand at any point in time. Information on prices and markets is got from dealers on fresh arrival. Most of the respondents in the north rely on trader associations, followed by personal links. Only very few (i.e. large livestock traders) have access to GSM and telephone lines. (However, drivers commonly have a mobile GSM which they use enroute to inform others about happenings on the route (e.g. where police check points are encountered). Few government sources of information are used, largely because the information is obsolete by the time it is received. The type of information mostly required includes supply and demand situation, prices of cattle, security and fuel situation.

Within Acida market, on the basis of the market information on prices provided by the *Dillali*, the livestock owner fixes a minimum and a maximum fee for his livestock. The owner can decide to stay around or not, it does not make any difference. If a buyer comes, it is the *dillali* that negotiates the price and sells within the price fixed. If the market prices have fluctuated, the dillali seeks out the owner and informs him of the changes for a new price to be fixed or the owner may decline to sell. No sale is made without the consent of the livestock owner.

Selection of southern markets is made through the dan kwamisho’s network of road transport workers across the country, now facilitated by the mobile phones. The *Dan’kwamisho* is able to provide the trader with price information of all the livestock markets in the country. Armed with this information the trader can decide where to send his livestock for sale.

The cattle traders in southern Nigeria at Akinyele have phones and those without have access to public mobile phones through which they contact their counterparts in the northern markets. Through such contacts they exchange information on prevailing prices and the cattle market situation both in the south and the north. They also get information on the dates of departure of drivers bringing cattle to the south.

**Credit provision**

Most of the livestock traders interviewed in northern Nigeria inherited their business from their fathers/relations. None of them have had access to financial institutions. Rather they depend on family sources (80 percent) and friends/co-traders (20 percent). Their inability to source credit from financial institutions is related to the collateral security required by the banks, which they
are unable to provide. Credit from friends and co-traders in livestock thus become the main sources of credit. In the past there was no written evidence of witness to the credit taken, given the element of trust which existed between them. These days however witness and written evidence are commonly used but the basic element of trust-acquaintance, social interaction belonging to the same trade and religion as well as living in the same neighborhood still persist (see Cohen 1965).

In Ibadan’s Bodija market, cattle can be sold on credit by the middlemen to the butchers and local cattle retailers. The dillalai can sell on credit through mutual trust which has developed between them and the regular buyers over a fairly long period of business interaction. Default in payment of cattle purchased on credit is rare but when it occurs, the different Associations are involved in ensuring payment. The buyer takes away the cattle without payment which is to be made at a later agreed date. In some cases credit sale may attract additional payment of between N5,000 and N10,000 on a cow depending on the length of the duration for payments. For parts of a cow, no additional cost is paid when credit is granted. These middlemen stand as surety for the buyer. Such a credit process is based on mutual trust between the dealers and the middlemen on the one hand and between the middlemen and the buyers on the other hand. After a fairly long period of business association, the dealers develop some confidence/trust for the middlemen who are their regular customers. The same occurs between middlemen and the buyers. The main reasons for selling on credit, however, include the buyers’ lack of capital, and the possibility of encouraging and retaining more customers for a dealer. Selling on credit also makes for faster sales.

**Market Security**

Considerable detail on security issues was collected for Acida market. The security situation at the Acida market is reasonably good compared to the general security situation in the country. The physical side of the market security has improved since the walling and reorganization of the market according to the market officials: “We used to have insecurity when the market was an open space- after complaints to the Sarki dan Maliki- he asked us to form a group and we did and he presented our case to the Local Government and that is how we got the market walled. Before then we had many cases of stolen cattle.”

There are now fewer cases of stolen livestock at Acida market and this occurs mostly when the animals are being loaded into lorries. As quoted by the informants the number of times this occurred in the last year ranged from roughly 3 to 12 times. The failure to collect accurate statistics on stolen animals could be attributed to the unwillingness of the officials to disclose the number of such cases for fear of the market loosing its reputation as a secured Kara market, but it is possible that the statistics are just not available considering the informality involved and the fact that no information on the market is recorded. Whatever the reason for the non-existence or non-release of information on stolen animals, it is apparent that it is a major area of concern to the officials of the market. Both the Sarkin Kasuwa, Chairman of the market and the livestock market traders have mentioned it as a major security problem.
discussions with the market officials concern over the problem of stolen animal was mentioned several times.

Another area of security concern in the market is the incidence of stolen livestock brought into Acida market for sale. It was reported that in many cases stolen livestock are handed over to *dillali* for sale. Before the animal is sold, the owner may come to the market to check for his animal. In that situation the thief never shows up again and the *dillali* is implicated. Transaction related security problem involved duping of *dillali*. One of the *dillalai* explains it thus:

“A person brings his livestock into the market- he gives it to a *dillali* who is to sell on his behalf. In the process problems occur. The *dilali* may not know that this is a stolen animal- many cases of that happen. Or a livestock owner gives his animal to *dilali* for sell- the owner may be moving with a thief- the *dilali* assumes they are together. The owner goes his own way to do other businesses. The thief hangs around- when a buyer comes and the price is being negotiated, the thief comes closer and acts as if the animal belongs to him by agreeing to the price- the *dillali* assumes they are together and hands over the money to the thief who runs away with the money. The cattle owner comes back and asked for the condition of his cattle and the *dillali* tells him that it has been sold, the owner demands for his money and the *dillali* says I have given it to the person you were together with. Then he will reply we were not together. You see the cattle owner will not agree, the *dillali* will have to pay the money. It is a risky business. Something has to be done about it”.

Smaller actors in the market such as the *yan’kora* and *masu gadi* equally experience some level of insecurity. According to one of them:

“That is the security problem- you buy a cattle and you arrange with the *dan-kora* to take it home for you. The *dan-kora* ties the animal waiting for the day time to transport the animal for you. He is gone somewhere before he comes back somebody has taken the animal away or got it loaded into a lorry. This happens. Hence, our call for an end to movement of animals in the night- either to go out or for loading.

The informal institutions engaged in Acida market security are many and they can be classified into external agency like the Vigilante, Market traditional authorities (Sarki), and the internal market Associations such as Miyyati Allah, Yan’kwamisho, *dillalai* and the market workers such as yan’lodii, *masu gadi* and yan’kora. Each one of them contribute collectively or singly in market security in Acida kara.

*Yan’banga* is a vigilante group that emerged in the mid 1980s to provide alternative security protection in the North because of the failure of the government security forces to deal with increasing security problems in the country. It is organised and managed by the community, under the authority of the traditional authorities. Majority of communities in the North fund and utilise the services of *Yan’banga*. The *yan’banga* in Acida provides security to Acida
town and as the security situation in the market worsens, they were invited by the market traditional authorities to deal with the problem. The Acida vigilante group is inadequate to provide security in the market, so Yan’banga from neighbouring towns are invited to assist the Acida Yan’banga every market day. According to the Chairman of the Market as well as the Chairman of the Yan’banga in Acida, the Yan’banga provides security in the market by patrolling the market day to monitor and flush out suspected thieves. If a known thief is found in the market, he is asked to leave the market or apprehended and released at the end of the market day.

The view of market customers on Yan,banga in the market ranges from indifference to support. There was only one informant with negative view on the security role of vigilante. He believes that security provision should be the role of the police, not the Yan’banga. However, for the majority of market users, yanbanga is a positive addition to the market security. In fact, they are preferred more than the police because of their closeness with the community. According to the market chairman “Dan’banga knows the bad eggs more than we (market customer) do because they interact with them outside the market. They know them and they ask them to leave the market or hand them over to the police. Similarly, a long distance trader said “we prefer the yan’banga than the police because the yan’banga are community members and therefore know the bad eggs in our midst, hence, they are likely to be more effective. It was when yan’banga starts operating in this market that theft reduced”. People have confidence on the yan’banga because of the belief that the yan’banga use charms for protection against fire arms. In fact, one of the dan’banga interviewed appealed for assistance from the public for funding to pay for such charms as it is now more expensive to pay for such charms.

The above statement is confirmed by the Chairman of the Yan’banga. He states that “whoever said there is no yan’banga in this market is telling lies. There was a time in this market when people were forcefully stopped and robbed of their wealth because of lack of security. This has stopped for over 8 - 10 months now. Nobody can complain of such insecurity now because we are active in the market”. From the above it is very evident that market security is provided by yan’banga in collaboration with the police.

Perhaps one of the most important non-security structures engaged in market security is the traditional authorities. The traditional authorities are responsible for the management of the market and in the process responsible for market security. The traditional market authorities such as Sarkin Pawa and market chairman established some rules from time to time for market security and safety. The last rule passed is over taming animal when taken round the market. It is made a market rule that animals moving around the market must get their front and back legs tied up to prevent causing injury to people. The next rule under consideration is banning loading after 7 pm. They are also said to be responsible for calling to order disobedient ‘boys’ in the market and disciplining them as long as the offence is not criminal, if it is criminal, the offender would be handed over to the police.
All the informants mention the role of Sarkin Pawa in conflict management and dispute resolution. According to a Dillali, the Sarkin Pawa patrols the market in order to settle conflict and disagreement between people in the market. He is also responsible in protecting trading norms of trust and reciprocity in the market. A butcher said *Sarkin Pawa* “patrols the market all the time to prevent any conflict or theft. For example, if a *dillali* sells an animal and give the money to a wrong owner, the *sarkin pawa* intervenes to ensure that the issue is resolved by forcing the *dillali* to present the person who collected the money from him or pay the livestock owner. Or if a butcher buys an animal and refuses to pay the money, the *Sarki* pawa intervenes and forces the butcher to pay the person”.

Market Associations in Acida market also play an important role in market security. The Miyyati Allah acts as a mediator between the Fulani and other market actors and also on issues related to cattle and Fulani. The Association also helps to detect and prevent stolen animals being sold in the market. So, every market day, the officials of the Miyyati Allah assemble in Acida to ensure smooth running of the market. In addition, the dillali accepts animal for sale from an unknown trader only after confirmation from the Miyyati that the animal is not a stolen one. The miyyati also assists and intervenes to resolve conflict in the market.

Other workers in the market were also said to play some roles in market security. A trader said “We do not want any security personnel in the market unless invited. There is a group of boys who provide protection to our animals. They are called *yan'lodi* and *Yan'gadi*. A person buys and leaves his animals with the *yan'lodi* and *Yan'gadi*, and no matter their size if you return the following days- you will meet them”.

*The Relationship between the Informal Market Security Institutions and the Police*

It is apparent that the police operate in the market only when they are invited, otherwise they operate outside the market and come in only to apprehend a suspected criminal offender. Thus, the police operate in the market to supplement efforts of the informal market security arrangements and they are invited only as the last resort. When invited they collaborate with traditional security outlet as Yan’banga. According to the Chairman of Yan’banga, they go on market patrol with the police- “we go on patrol with them right from 12.00 am till 6.00 am. We know the bad eggs in our community. That is why we get the support of the police, traditional authority and Local Government Authority. This car I am driving belongs to the LGA”.

The role of police in market security is not viewed favourably in the market by majority of the non-market officials. At best it is viewed with sceptism, and at worst with dislike and suspicion. Referring to the problem of pick pocketing in the market, a consumer said “let the police helps with the pick pocketing problem. They know them, let them deal with them, they cannot”. A trader said “if there is breakage of law and order you do not see them. They do not provide security to us”. Another one said “no, we do not relate with them since they do not protect our animal- you only see police if there is breakage of law for them
to get what they can out of it. Similar view was also held by a Butcher where he said “we have nobody to protect us. Look, what we want from the Local Government is the building of shelter for our boys and for them to send the police to protect us not to collect our money. If they are coming to provide security, not to disturb and harass us they are welcomed. What we do not want is for them to come and be harassing us”. The sceptism is not related to the police alone, even the role of the Sarkin Pawa was questioned by two of our informants. The foregoing indicates the relevance of informal institutions in the overall management and running of Acida market. Without them, one cannot see how trading in livestock could be smooth and effective.

Inter-ethnic conflict and the livestock industry
A brief note on this security-related issue is relevant here, since settler-indigene disputes are reported to be a major source of inter-ethnic conflict in Nigeria. The Bodija inter-ethnic conflict between the Hausa cattle traders and the Yoruba marketers started from a dispute between a goat trader and some market women. However, it is worth noting that there was no disturbance/fighting among the Hausa and Yoruba cattle traders. The main reason for this can only be attributed to the mutual understanding and friendship which trading in the same commodity has created over the years. Also many of the traders interact socially. They attend one another’s ceremonies such as children’s weddings, burials and religious festivities. It is common for Yoruba traders who are Christians to attend Muslim festivals (il-de filtri and ileyaa) and for Hausa Muslim traders to visit their Yoruba counterparts, at Christmas and Easter festivals.

Consumption and food safety
Veterinary staff are supposed to monitor the quality of livestock slaughtered and transported for consumption, as well provide veterinary services to the livestock traders. But, like many other things in Nigeria, it is not working that way because of lack of facilities and supervision.

There exist no consumer group or structure in the markets, though some institutions in the market are expected to protect the interest of the consumer. The chairman of Acida market and the Sarkin Kasuwa are there to protect the interest of both the consumers and the traders. Sarkin Pawa is responsible for complaints from consumers on meat, Shugaban dillalai is responsible for complaints from livestock owners as regards to payment of livestock etc. The conflict of interest that is likely to emerge as a result of the Sarkin pawa position in protecting the interest of both the butchers and the consumers seems to be neutralised through the people’s perception of the Sarki as father of everybody. This observation is supported by secondary data where Adamu (1978:12) observes that one of the basic characteristics of the market system in Hausaland “was and still is the strict observance by the buyers and sellers of the authority and arbitration of the Sarkin Kasuwa appointed by the chief of the town”.

Regulation in the transport sector
In the case of the cattle trade, transportation constitutes a crucial function and a significant cost item.
Formal regulation in the transport sector includes vehicle inspectors who should normally check vehicles road worthiness, drivers and vehicle licences. Police are supposed to provide security through check points. However, most of the check points have been turned into ‘toll gates’ where the Police are bribed. The amount of bribe allegedly offered to the Police range from as little as N100.00 to as high as N10,000 depending on the alleged offence(s) committed. Livestock truck drivers say that they just pay the bribe in order to overcome delays on their journey.

Many other semi-formal and non-formal sector actors are involved in the conduct of livestock transportation business.

The various cattle dealers’ associations, the National Union of Road Transport Workers (NURTW), the Association of Cart Pushers and the loaders perform the regulatory role by ensuring good behaviour among their members, controlling their activities and settling petty quarrels which might ensue in the process of transacting business. Many of these Associations have no formal constitution but they rely on norms which they have developed after long years of existence and which they enforce with relative ease.

After a cattle purchase the falke informs his Dan’kwamisho of his or his group transport requirements. Transportation of livestock depends largely of the availability of vehicles (trailers) most of which (95 percent) are owned by transporters in Jega town, Kebbi state. It is organised through Yan Kwammission (commission agents) who are approached by potential livestock traders for a vehicle. The yan kwommission arranges for the price, date and time that the cattle are to be transported. Members of NURTW (yan union) also assist the yan kwommission in sourcing vehicles for livestock traders. If the trader does not have enough cattle to load a vehicle, the yan kwommission approach or are approached by other traders who have few cattle to transport. The cattle are then combined with each trader marking his own cattle with a special sign and the agreed price is paid, the vehicle is loaded by masu lodi (loaders) and the journey is set to take place. In some cases this process may take between 2 – 3 days before a vehicle can be fully loaded. Usually departure to southern Nigeria destinations is on Tuesdays between 6 – 8 o’clock in the evening when the temperatures are cooler.

The livestock are looked after and guarded by the Maigadi until the following day for loading into the lorry the Dan’kwamisho has arranged. The Dan’kwamisho makes contact among his pool of lorry owners and drivers and negotiate with them on the fare on behalf of the trader. The dan’kwamisho performs similar function as that of the dillali such as mediating between livestock traders and drivers, provides security and insurance by settling the problem of stolen animals, issuing ticket to departing vehicle which is useful in the case of accident on the road or problem in area of destination etc.

Livestock originating from the market are transported through yan’kwamishon, unless by foot. Movement on the hoof is the oldest means of cattle movement and it now accounts for a very small proportion of the total cattle transport market. The dwindling use of the movement on hoofs can be ascribed to the
harsh environment enroute and the transit animal mortalities. Iro (1994) noted that a crude estimate showed that the animals lose up to 40% of their original weight during the more than 1000 kilometers’ journey from the northern to the southern markets. However, movement on the hoof to the northern collecting markets like Acida is still common. Although more costly than rail, the road now dominates the movement of cattle in Nigeria. Road truckage is dominated by the private sector and, therefore, it is more efficiently run than the publicly owned and operated railways.

The cattle traders who do not own vehicles rely on road transporters to haul their herds from northern sources to the southern markets. Sometimes 5 or 6 dealers join together to hire a vehicle and the cost of hire is shared according to the number of cattle owned. Cattle movement by road is not without its own problems. For example, the cattle are kept standing and in some cases laying in the vehicles throughout the long journey without food or water (Ademosu, 1976). Most rural roads are seasonal and inoperable during the rainy season. Vehicles are prone to accidents and cattle and freight insurance is absent in Nigeria. Numerous feeder roads were constructed by the Directorate of Foods, Roads and Rural Infrastructure (DFRRI) between 1986 and 1990, mostly in the rural areas (Filani, 1993). These link some of the cattle producing areas to their primary markets in the northern states, facilitating the cattle dealers’ movement of cattle to weekly markets. Unfortunately due to the poor maintenance culture in Nigeria, most of these roads have deteriorated.

Through his networks of road transport workers across the country and now facilitated by the mobile phones, the Dan’kwamisho is able to provide the trader with price information for livestock markets across the country. Armed with this information the trader can decide where to send his livestock to for sale. The livestock trader may or may not accompany the driver, but most of them said they select one of them to go with the animals but the person may not stay until all the livestock are sold. There is an element of mutual trust among the dealers in the transportation of cattle. Some of the traders may return with the sales they have made before the week runs out to trade again in the Acida next market day, leaving the unsold livestock with a dillali to sell. Central to livestock transportation by road is masu lodi, that is, those who load and off load the livestock. Payment for the services of Yankwamisho, yanlodi, yankora are supposed to be a fixed fare, but the informality in the transactions has made most of the payment to be negotiated.

Transporting livestock to the south is a costly and risky business. In terms of transportation cost, it costs N2000 as transport fare per cattle to the South. Other levies are paid to the union of transporters, Local Government, Acida market authority and payment of taxes at about 8 checkpoints from Sokoto, Kebbi, Niger States to Kogi, Kwara, Oyo and Lagos States. In each of the state, there is at least one checkpoint where revenue is collected ranging from N50-N100 per cattle. In fact tax, levy and other charges is a major complaint among the livestock traders. Highway robbery is a further hazard. Few livestock traders utilise modern banking facilities such as electronic money transfer.

Data analysis reveals that the cost of transporting one cow from Acida to southern Nigeria ranges from N2000 – 3500 per cow, depending on size and
distance that livestock has to be moved. The costs reported at Ibadan range from as high as N3,000.00 per head of cattle from Gombe, Bauchi State (above 1000 kms), to N1,300.00 in Birni-Gwari, Kaduna State (600 kms) and N700.00 in Mariga, Niger State (400 kms) from Ibadan (Illiassou, 2000). For a lorry-load of 15, the costs are N45,000.00, N19,500.00 and N10,500.00 from Gombe, Birni-Gwari and Mariga respectively. This is much higher than the N15,000.00 per lorry load given by Iro for movement from Kano to Lagos in 1993. Other factors which can influence the transport costs include the size of cattle, the number carried by each vehicle and the season of movement. Usually transport costs are slightly higher around festivals.

When there is petrol scarcity prices also rise or frequency of movement is reduced. In the last six months there has not been any petrol scarcity because of the effect of deregulation in the petroleum industry. The cattle traders show a sign of relief. Between 1986 and 2003, due to sustained devaluation of the naira on account of the implementation of the IMF Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), in addition to the criminal non-maintenance of the four refineries in Nigeria, domestic production was overtaken through the imperative of petroleum imports. Given the low capacity utilization, excessive unit of operating costs, low productivity amongst other factors, petroleum shortages became the order of the day in spite of substantial increases in the prices of products since 1990. In very general terms, the impact of the fuel crisis was profound and having domino effects on the economy. For example it has been stated that if there is 10% increase in the pump price of petroleum products, there will be an increase of 6.2% on transportation costs, utility 3% and petroleum sector 4% (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2000). Obviously these figures are conservative and were computed from model simulation results.

During periods of fuel scarcity, many petroleum marketers hoard the product to sell at astronomical prices. Although there was a law on fuel diversion, hoarding (for example the Special Tribunal on Miscellaneous Offences Act Cap 410, laws of Nigeria which prescribe stiff penalties for fuel diversion, hoarding and smuggling, but these acts continue to persist with impunity. The reasons for the inability of the federal government to enforce the law has been succinctly captured by Ndefo (1999) when she asserts that:

*It may be because most perpetrators of these illegal acts are well placed wealthy men who seem to regard themselves above the law. Furthermore petroleum filling station attendants and law enforcement agents sent to enforce order in the sales of fuel at stations collude with hoarders who are frequently enabled to procure petroleum outside queues …… relapse of the supply situation tempts us to believe that either the powerful cabal holding the sector to ransom is yet to be dislodged or that the federal government has not told the nation the whole truth about what is going on in the petroleum industry.* (Ndefo, 2000: 140, 141)
With particular reference to the Sokoto area, the fuel situation was made worse not only because the area shares a border with Niger Republic, which has been a major outlet of petroleum smuggling but also because the powers that be in the state are themselves involved in petroleum marketing and its attendant sharp practices. It is in this context that the high cost of transportation of livestock has to be understood. This notwithstanding, it has to be noted that the period of fuel scarcity provide succor for the unemployed youths as they all rush to take part in the lucrative black market in the sale of petroleum products.

The cost of transport is calculated at the end of the journey i.e. amount at destination, taking into consideration cost of hiring the vehicle, incidental expenses on enroute the journey such as jangali tax, bribes to Police and other security operatives, feeding of animals on the way amongst others. When the animals are finally sold, the amount realized is shared proportionately to the number of cattle owned by the individuals having subtracted all the incidental expenses incurred on the way. In this process it is the poorer traders (with fewer cattle) who lose out given the high cost of incidental expenses incurred on the way and which are shared on pro-rata basis. This explains why some of the poorer animal owners prefer to sell to larger traders in Sokoto and be paid cash outright rather than wait till the driver returns from the journey. Again in this process, the price of cattle is generally lower at Sokoto given the anticipated expenses on the way. This is one of the ways through which drivers also act as traders thereby maximizing his profit.

Usually it takes an average of between 1½ days and 3 days to move cattle from the various northern sources to Ibadan. Other costs are incurred in the transportation of cattle. For instance, loaders charge between ₦100 and ₦200 per cow, depending on the size of the cows. Also cost of loading varies with the positioning of the cows in the vehicles. Positioning could be by standing (₦100.00) or by laying which attracts ₦250 per cow. This difference is said to be due to the fact that it is more difficult to load cattle by laying them in the vehicles. The unloading at Ibadan attracts only ₦50 per head of cattle whether the positioning is standing or laying.

Certain charges are also paid on each head of cattle during transit. This, on the average, is ₦50.00 but it could vary from one state to another. While in Sokoto, Niger, Kebbi and Kwara States the amount is ₦50.00, the Oyo State Government collects ₦100.00 per cattle in transit within the state before reaching the Akinyele Kraal. Payment made in transit is borne by the cattle owners and not the vehicle owner/driver. However, the owner/driver pays the police who collect illegal fees at various check points enroute. The drivers encounter an average of fifteen to twenty check points on a single journey. The legal check points are the 5 interstate junctions where the charges referred to above are collected. Others manned mainly by the police are illegal. Payment on each occasion also varies between N100 and N200. In other words a driver can pay up to between N1000 to N2,000 on a journey. Such charges are passed on to the cattle dealers in the charges originally paid to the vehicle owner.
About 50 vehicles move cattle from Akinyele to Bodija daily. Unlike at the source in the North, the cattle dealers at Akinyele are not free to choose their vehicles, because the vehicles are arranged to move in turns depending on their time of arrival at the Kraal. As stated earlier, the cattle traders in the northern markets arrange their own vehicles after purchase. They then have the freedom of choice which is lacking in Akinyele market. The National Union of Road Transport Workers (NURTW) is responsible for maintaining discipline and ensuring that the drivers obey their turns.

Before leaving Akinyele the cattle dealers pay a tax of N100 to the Akinyele Local Government and another N100.00 to the Oyo State Government. The cows are moved to the vehicles at Akinyele Kraal park in either of two ways. These are by ropes used to drag the cows to the vehicles at N100 per cow and by cart pushers (omolankes) at N150.00 per cow. Loaders take N100 per cow. All cows are laid in the vehicles during the movement from Akinyele to Bodija market.

The Association of cart pushers and loaders organize movement to and loading of vehicles. Each member of the Association has his own regular dealers and they stick to them in movement and loading on daily basis.

At the Bodija market, the old pre-1999 Kraal is still used to accommodate the cows on arrival. A section of this is now fenced where cows that are not sold in a day are kept overnight for a payment of N50.00 per cow. Off-loaders take only N50.00 per cattle in Bodija and they are responsible for moving the cattle by rope to the abattoir in the market. The rope used costs N50.00 per piece.

There is an Association of Cart pushers (omolankes) made up of 40 members at Bodija. All of them are males and of the same Yoruba ethnic group. Although there is no restriction to entry on ethnic basis, only Yorubas engage in cart pushing at Bodija market. Cart pushing is also not a woman’s job. Only a few of them own one cart each and some own two. It costs about N15,000.00 to build a cart. The owners rent out the carts at N20 per trip from the Kraal to the abattoir. The cart pushers carry only ailing or tired cows (due to exhaustion during transit) to the slaughter house at N150.00 per cow. In essence, the pusher makes an average profit of N130.00 per trip. Average daily proceed for cart pushers is put at between N750-N1,000.00. The owners of the carts themselves have to work in addition to renting their carts to others in order to make ends meet.

Although the association of cart pushers has no written constitution, there are certain known norms which the members must not violate. For example, each regular cart pusher has his own customer among the cattle dealers and no one can move cows belonging to others’ customers. They hold their weekly meetings on Mondays starting at 1.00pm. Weekly payment of N100 is made by each member for maintenance and development of the association. Additional N20.00 is paid and put in a separate account for purposes of assisting members who may be engaged in any type of ceremonies ranging from naming of a new baby to burying parents or relations.
Another set of transporters within the Bodija market are the head porters (Alaarus). These are all women who carry parts of slaughtered cows for themselves (if they are meat sellers) or for others at a cost of ₦30.00 from the abattoir to the vehicles on the Bodija – University of Ibadan main road. Each porter could make an average of ₦450- ₦600 per day, depending on the market situation.

The road leading from the Bodija main market to the abattoir is in a very bad state of disrepair. Consequently, the vehicles that move slaughtered cows to the abattoir to other parts of the metropolis charge fees which are generally higher than the normal.

Movement of slaughtered cows (whole or parts) from Bodija to other markets is done mainly by taxi cabs and to some extent by 'danfos' and pick-up vans. Women head porters (Alaarus) carry the slaughtered parts to the vehicles either at the park near the abattoir or on the main road at a cost of ₦30.00 per trip load. There are a few male Hausa head porters also but they operate more in the non-cattle trading section of Bodija market. The ‘Alaarus’ are not organized in any way and entry is free and uncontrolled. Their ages vary from about 18 years to forty five especially for the women.

To conclude this section, it must be noted that the task of estimating transportation cost in the cattle trade is more complicated once various legal and illegal fees paid in transit when cattle is moved from the northern markets to Ibadan are taken into account. Also some of such actors in the transport chain as the cart pushers and head loaders have not been reflected in previous studies on cattle marketing in Bodija market. Generally, transport cost of moving cattle from the source to Bodija market is made up of fees charged by the vehicle owners/drivers and the loaders at the originating sources in the northern markets, the fees paid to states and the illegal collections by the police enroute during transit. Also the fees charged by transporters at Akinyele market by the loaders and off loaders at both Akinyele and Bodija markets and the charges by the head porters. Total transport rates for moving cattle from the northern states to Bodija market, therefore, include the vehicle hiring costs (at the northern market and Akinyele Kraal) plus the loading and off-loading costs, costs of attendants that accompany the vehicles, taxes paid to states enroute from the north, illegal fees collected by the police at check points, costs for cart pushers and porters at different levels before the cow reaches the abattoir at Bodija market. For the final consumer, the transport costs also include the cost of moving from the sub-markets to the consumer’s home.

Livestock transport security and insurance issues
Transporting livestock between the north and south west is not secure. All the informants in Acida market have a story to tell about their experiences or other people’s experiences with armed robbers on the road. One of the informants explains the problem of insecurity in livestock long distance trading:
“Once you take your cattle to the Kurmi (South) to sell, you never know the money is yours until you get into your house. In as close as Sifawa (30 km away from Acida), our people were robbed of their money around 8 pm. That is
on the part of cattle traders. For the drivers- the major problem is that since the drivers do not have money, and the robbers can not steal cattle- they beat up drivers, sometimes even kill them. In the past, they block the roads, and when the lorry falls down they attack. Now they are bolder.”

Another narrates:
“We have robbers on our roads, two months ago- we were stopped by robbers around 8.00 am along Zuru road. I lost over 480,000 Naira. We were 8 in number and we all lost money to the robbers. We use to take 20 cattle every market to the south, now we can hardly afford 5 cows. If not because of the sutura (protection) of this business we would not have been able to have 5 animals to trade today”.

Since the traders carry a lot of cash on return journeys from the south, they risk attacks by armed robbers. Unfortunately, cattle in transit are not formally insured. Freight insurance is available from a few companies for freight transporters especially of export produce (cocoa, palm oil and formerly groundnut traders), and imported goods moving from the coastal parts to factories and individuals in the hinterland but Nigerians especially cattle traders are usually suspicious of insurance companies, which are perceives as quick at collecting premiums but always reluctant to pay claims. They may be unwilling to go through the usually long and difficult process of making claims in case of losses. Once traders incur some loss or misfortune in their trade, they seek solace in God. On what they do if they are duped or robbed of their capital or animals, they said they search, if they do not find their animal or money they resign to fate and seek for Allah’s protection against another time.

When we asked who is responsible for any loss if vehicles break down or are involved in accidents during transit, we were told that the cattle dealers take responsibility for their cattle. However, informal means are use to serve as insurance for loses incurred through trading. Social networks and support from fellow traders and dillalai have pulled a number of the respondents from the brink of ruin. One of the informants quoted elsewhere describes such kind of support from fellow traders as sutura (cloth), signifying the protection, care, and status their network provides to one another. All the market Associations have the practice of helping one another in a period of crisis or calamity. If a member incurs any lost, he is assisted by his fellow colleagues either through a fixed amount charged to all members. The total amount raised is handed over to the affected person. If what is raised is inadequate, the association may lend the affected person some money to continue with the business. Thus, although the majority of the livestock traders and drivers do not utilize formal insurance services (for obvious reason of inefficiency and ineffectiveness of the system in Nigeria), they have nonetheless being able to utilize and benefit from informal insurance services from family, friends and importantly, association and its membership.

Conclusions
The livestock trade is overwhelmingly male-dominated and highly stratified with many different types of actor. Improvements in livestock market transactions and transportation cannot be achieved without understanding the social context
within which the market operates and the norms and relations that define trading and transport practices. It is in this light that the findings of this research and the conclusions drawn are important.

The importance and dominance of informal institutions and social networks in livestock market trading and the associated transportation business in Nigeria is obvious from the findings of all three case studies: the role of informal insurance is perhaps particularly noteworthy. What is also evident from the research findings is the low level of involvement of the formal institutions in the market. Both rich and poor participants in the livestock trade depend on – and in many cases seem to prefer - the informal market institutions. Within the livestock markets, vigilantes are preferred to the police for immediate local security, for instance. Similarly, in the cattle transport business, dealers’ associations, the National Union of Road Transport Workers (NURTW), the Association of Cart Pushers and the loaders perform a crucial regulatory role by ensuring good behaviour among their members, controlling their activities and settling petty quarrels which might ensue in the process of transacting business. Many of these Associations have no formal constitution but they rely on norms which they have developed after long years of existence and which they enforce with relative ease. (By contrast, the police and other highway authorities regulating transport movements are widely viewed as agents of extortion.)

The role of commission agents and the livestock associations in the control of market space is more controversial. Our studies suggest that while these agents play a crucial role in the livestock trade, their ability to bar outsiders is considerable and arguably reduces the potential of poorer livestock owners to obtain a good price for their stock. However, their role in the management of a relatively high-value trade with corresponding risks appears invaluable in Nigeria’s current trading and transport context and their returns merely commensurate with this. The role of dillalai in mitigating transaction risks and costs is central in a market that is temporary, transitory and where most customers are from distant areas. The dillalai and the Dan kwamishon provide some elements of permanency and reliability in a market where people from far distant places come and go with their goods. The widespread expansion of telephone use in collection and dissemination of information in the livestock trade is giving them increasing potential to adjust rapidly to market opportunities.

Despite the effectiveness and advantages of the informal institutions in market and livestock trading, the increased insecurity in the transportation of livestock across the country makes the integration of formal institutions, particularly banking and insurance institutions with the livestock marketing essential. We suggest a programme is urgently needed, for instance, to enlighten traders on the availability and advantages of lodging their money in a bank for collection at their destination. For the most part, however, informal institutions are likely to provide the main route to effective market operations in the livestock trade for some years to come.